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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Hubbard appeals, contending the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, or alternatively, by not ruling on his 
motion for the district court judge to recuse herself. First, he asserts that the district 
court's statements at his sentencing hearing demonstrated a violation of his 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. Specifically, he contends that the 
district court's statements indicated that it was sentencing him based on the facts of the 
underlying lewd conduct case, as opposed to the facts of his current failure to register 
as a sex offender charge. He also asserts that the district court's statements 
demonstrated bias against him and so, it erred by not ruling on his request for the 
district court judge to recuse herself. 
The State responds, asserting that Mr. Hubbard has failed to show error. 
Specifically, on the double jeopardy issue, the State argues that, by looking to the 
purported purpose behind the district court's statements, those statements would not 
violate the protections against double jeopardy. On the disqualification issue, the State 
argues that Mr. Hubbard did not file a properly-formulated motion to disqualify the judge. 
The State's arguments are mistaken. On the double jeopardy issue, the 
purported purpose of the district court's statements is either irrelevant to the resolution 
of the issue presented or requires an evidentiary hearing to establish. Either way, the 
order summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition is erroneous. On the disqualification 
issue, the State's arguments only serve to promote form over substance, which is an 
improper basis upon which to reject Mr. Hubbard's claims. At any rate, Mr. Hubbard's 
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statements in his verified pleadings were sufficient to raise the issue of disqualification. 
For any of those reasons, this Court should reverse the order summarily dismissing 
Mr. Hubbard's petition, or, alternatively, it should vacate the order summarily dismissing 
the petition and remand the case for new proceedings before a different judge. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hubbard's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred when, based on its explanation of the purpose 
behind its statements at the sentencing hearing, it summarily dismissed 
Mr. Hubbard's double jeopardy claim for post conviction relief. 
2. Whether the district court erred by not ruling on Mr. Hubbard's motion for the 
district court judge to recuse herself from this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When, Based On Its Explanation Of The Purpose Behind Its 
Statements At The Sentencing Hearing, It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hubbard's Double 
Jeopardy Claim For Post Conviction Relief 
Mr. Hubbard has argued that the district court's statements at his sentencing 
hearing in his failure to register case demonstrated that it was sentencing him based on 
the facts of his prior lewd conduct case from California, rather than the facts of the 
failure to register charge in Idaho. He contended that this was a violation of his 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. The district court summarily 
dismissed that claim based on its explanation of its purpose behind those statements -
that it was trying to consider Mr. Hubbard's criminal history and address a point made 
by Mr. Hubbard's attorney in that regard. 
On appeal, Mr. Hubbard contends that the district court's reliance on its 
explanation of the purpose behind its statements was erroneous for one of two reasons. 
First, whether the record demonstrated a double jeopardy violation was a question of 
law and no additional fact-finding was necessary, and therefore, the factual explanation 
of the purpose behind the statements is irrelevant to the issue presented. Second, if 
additional fact-finding into the purpose behind the district court's statements was 
appropriate, then summary dismissal was inappropriate because there was a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the purpose behind the district court's statements. 
The State's response to this double jeopardy issue hinges on its examination of 
the purported purpose behind the district court's statements at the sentencing hearing, 
and it claims that purpose was proper and clear from the record. However, the State 
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does not respond to Mr. Hubbard's contention that, if additional fact finding was 
necessary, then the summary dismissal order was erroneous. (See generally Resp. 
Br.) Even if the State is correct and record suggests a potentially valid pu 
behind the district court's statements, 1 that post hoc explanation of the statements is 
dispositive. Rather, it constitutes conflicting evidence on a point of material fact, and 
created a genuine issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). Therefore, if this Court concludes that the 
district court needed to make factual findings regarding the purpose behind 
statements at sentencing, then the district court improperly summarily dismissed 
Mr. Hubbard's petition for relief. In that instance, this Court should remand the case for 
an evidentiary hearing.2 
However, if this Court concludes no additional fact-finding was necessary, 
then the State's contentions about the purported purpose behind the district court's 
statements at the sentencing hearing are irrelevant to the resolution of this issue. What 
the district court subjectively intended or did not intend in making those statements is a 
1 The State points to the Court of Appeals' decision on Mr. Hubbard's direct appeal to 
support its position. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Even though the Court of Appeals did discuss 
the factual purpose behind the district court's statements, that discussion does not 
control in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying Mr. Hubbard's 
motion for leniency because it concluded that the double jeopardy claim was not 
properly raised as fundamental error in that appeal. State v. Hubbard, 2013 
Unpublished Opinion No. 374 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. As such, its discussion of 
the purported purpose behind the district court's statements at sentencing was 
unnecessary to the decision, and, thus, was dicta. Even so, its explanation of the 
purpose does not resolve the genuine issue of material fact; the question of the district 
court's purpose behind its statements is still a contested issue. Therefore, the decision 
to summarily dismiss the claim, rather than hold an evidentiary hearing, was still 
erroneous. 
2 At that evidentiary hearing, the presiding judge should not be permitted to be the 
source of the evidence being considered. I.R.E. 605. That means, in this case, the 
evidentiary hearing would have to occur before a different district court judge. 
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question of fact that was not discussed on the record. As such, it would require 
additional fact finding to establish. Thus, if no additional fact finding is necessary, the 
purported purpose behind the district court's statements has no bearing on whether the 
facts in the record demonstrate the error. Rather, the proper analysis would be to focus 
on the statements the district court actually made. 
For example, the State asserts that the district court only mentioned the victim in 
the prior sex offense case as part of its appropriate consideration of the sentencing 
objectives. (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State contends that the district court was trying to 
consider the fact that Mr. Hubbard's prior crime created a victim and that is a legitimate 
fact to consider at sentencing. (See Resp. Br., p.9.) However, what the district court 
was thinking or what it meant to say when it talked about that victim was not expressed 
at the sentencing hearing, and so, it is not a fact that is clear from the face of the record. 
Therefore, without further fact finding, that argument is irrelevant to the resolution of the 
issue. 
Furthermore, the State's analysis ignores part of the actual statement made at 
Mr. Hubbard's sentencing hearing in the underlying case: that the district court called 
the victim "the victim in this case." (Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) 
There is an important difference between considering the fact that the defendant has a 
prior record which includes certain crimes and delving into the underlying facts of those 
prior offenses and sentencing the defendant as though the facts from the underlying 
case were part of the current case. While it may be appropriate for the district court to 
consider the fact that there would have been a victim as a result of the prior offense, it is 
not appropriate to characterize that person as a victim in this case, and impose 
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sentence as if she were the victim in this case. The latter constitutes a double jeopardy 
violation because the district court has imposed a second sentence for those underlying 
facts. Cf. State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding "it is not a 
permissible remedy for that dissatisfaction [with another judge's sentencing decision] to 
sentence Findeisen again for those same offenses"). Since the district court below 
characterized the victim from the underlying case as "the victim in this case" and 
sentenced Mr. Hubbard as if that were so, the facts on the face of the record (the 
statements actually made at the sentencing hearing) demonstrate the double jeopardy 
violation. 
This analysis applies to all the State's arguments on this issue. They go beyond 
the facts clear from the face of the record, and so, if no additional fact finding was 
necessary, those arguments should be rejected as irrelevant. Considering only the 
facts clear from the record (i.e., the statements the district court actually made), the 
double jeopardy violation is clear. (See App. Br., pp.6-15.) 
Therefore, whether additional fact finding was necessary or not, the State's 
arguments are misplaced. As a result, this Court should grant Mr. Hubbard relief in this 
case. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Not Ruling On Mr. Hubbard's Motion For The District Court 
Judge To Recuse Herself From This Case 
In his verified petition, Mr. Hubbard asserted that the district court judge's 
comments during his underlying criminal case demonstrated that she was biased 
against him. (R., p.6.) Therefore, he asked for relief in the form of the district court 
judge recusing herself from this case. (R., p.7.) On appeal, he contends that this was 
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sufficient to constitute a motion for disqualification, and thus, because the district court 
did not rule on that motion, none of the subsequent orders were valid. See I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(5); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470 {1995) (quoting Lewiston Lime Co. v. 
Barney, 87 Idaho 462,467 (1964)). 
The State responds, listing four reasons why, in its view, Mr. Hubbard's request 
for the judge to recuse herself because of bias was insufficient to constitute a motion for 
disqualification of a judge under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2): 
First, [Mr.] Hubbard did not make the request in the form of a motion. 
Second, he did not cite I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) in making the request. Third, he 
did not accompany the request with an affidavit stating distinctly the 
grounds for disqualification. Finally, [Mr.] Hubbard did not accompany his 
request with a notice of hearing, as required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A). 
(Resp. Br., pp:11-·12 (footnote omitted).) The State's argument in this regard is 
mistaken. 
All of the State's contentions, but particularly the first, second, and fourth, only 
serve to promote form over substance, in that the State is arguing that Mr. Hubbard has 
to file the motion in the proper form with the proper citations, or else the claim will fail. 
That argument is wholly inappropriate. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003) 
(holding that "[s]ubstance not form governs"); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 792-93 (2004) (recognizing that a pro se petitioner (such as Mr. Hubbard at the 
time he filed his verified pleadings) will often file incomplete or conclusory documents 
because he may not know what the essential elements or forms are). Thus, the fact 
that Mr. Hubbard did not raise his challenge to the district court judge in the desired 
form with specific citations to the relevant rules or with the appropriate accompanying 
request for a hearing does not mean the appropriate result is to reject his claim. The 
substance of his verified pleadings - that the district court judge was biased toward him, 
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and therefore, should not continue to preside over this case - is sufficient to raise the 
issue. 
Furthermore, the State's third contention - that Mr. Hubbard did not present an 
affidavit stating distinctly the grounds for disqualification - is factually inaccurate. 
Mr. Hubbard made his allegations of judicial bias in his verified petition. (See R., pp.6-
8.) A verified pleading setting forth evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of 
the signor has the same probative force as an affidavit. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 
933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, by alleging in his verified petition that the district 
court judge made statements on the record which evidenced her bias, Mr. Hubbard set 
forth the specific grounds for his request for disqualification in what was, effectively, an 
affidavit. (R., p.6.) He even provided a citation to the relevant transcript from his 
underlying criminal case to support his allegations. (R., p.6.) Thus, the State's third 
contention is wholly inaccurate and should be rejected as such. 
The substance of Mr. Hubbard's claims clearly raised the question of judicial bias 
and requested that the judge recuse herself as a result. Therefore, there was effectively 
a motion for disqualification that the district court needed to rule on. I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5); 
Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 470; cf. State v. Bias, 40930, 2014 WL 5734662 (Idaho Ct. App. 
Nov. 6, 2014 )(petition for review pending) (vacating the district court's orders because 
the defendant's "general averments" regarding a potential conflict with counsel and a 
request for substitute counsel had triggered the district court's mandatory duty to 
resolve that issue before reaching the merits of the pending motions). The State does 
not argue against the merits of Mr. Hubbard's claims - that the district court judge 
should have recused herself and/or that the district court's failure to rule on the motion 
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for disqualification means that the subsequent orders are void and of no effect. Rather, 
it appears to contend in a footnote that because counsel (once appointed) did not renew 
the motion for disqualification, Mr. Hubbard should not be permitted to pursue the issue 
on appeaL (Resp. Br., p.11 n.3.) However, counsel's acquiescence to improper district 
court action after the issue has been presented does not bar appellate review of the 
district court's actions. See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 449 (2010). 
Therefore, this case should be remanded for resolution of the motion to disqualify the 
district court judge. As discussed in the Appellant's Brief, the facts of this case should 
result in the district court judge's recusal. (See App. Br., pp.14-17.) 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hubbard respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post conviction relief and order relief be granted. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing his 
petition and remand this case for new proceedings before a new district court judge. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2014. 
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BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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